Infant Baptism: Valid but irregular.

I've posted on Baptism, before. You can find that, here. I am a credo-baptist, however, unlike many Baptists, I do not think that someone who was baptized as an infant has a baptism that is necessarily invalid. I think we have an example that makes this consistent with the theology we already have in place. You can listen to a short exposition of that position, here, by John Piper.

A Cognate:

If you took the time to click on the Piper link, what you heard was a description of whether we should baptize those who are mentally challenged to the point that they cannot make a public profession. He argues that we should baptize these folks on the basis of a perception that we can gain from that individual. He then argues that we should probably not baptize these people if we gain no perception from the individual. 

I mostly agree with Piper, here. I think he has focused on God's grace and also defended the sanctity of Baptism in a very meaningful way. Therefore, I also agree with him that the Baptism of these non-professors would be valid.

Infant Baptism?

Okay, so, what about infant baptisms, are all infant baptisms valid? NO, they most certainly are not. Okay, I am sure that I've lost a bunch of folks at this point, but bear with me. I, as a Baptist, don't remember a single time in my life where I did not love God. That's not to say that there was no specific moment where I repented of my sins and professed myself to be a follower of Christ. There was definitely such a time, and it was on December 18th, 1995. I was six years old. But, thinking in terms of a Calvinistic soteriology, I do not believe that I lacked faith in God and his promises before that point, and I do think that God regenerated my soul before that point and brought me to that faith. 

If I had been baptized before my profession, given those details, I would readily accept them as valid. The presence of that regeneration, though prior to my profession, would be evident in a way that was similar to what we have seen in the discussion of the mentally disabled, above. If I am going to count the baptism of the mentally disabled as valid without a clearly articulated profession, it is only consistent that I grant the same to those infants who were baptized and who showed signs of God's regenerative work before articulating a confession. 

Now, in line with what Piper talked about with those who showed no signs of regeneration... if a person who was baptized as an infant do not reflect in their lives the work of regeneration, and live out a rebellion against God without ever having done so, and then they repent and come to faith. I would say that when that person was baptized there was no evidence of the work of redemption and therefore no evidence that God had worked regeneration in their souls. This person was an improper candidate for baptism as an infant.

Why not baptize everyone as infants?

As a Baptist, I believe that the form of baptism prescribed for believers is upon profession of faith. I respect a lot of my paedo-baptist brothers and I cherish them. However, I also believe that baptism by immersion is what is prescribed in Scriptures, and I would readily affirm that a baptism is not invalidated simply because it was not by immersion (Sam Waldron, who wrote an exposition of the LBCF 1689 that I have reviewed a few chapters of, agrees.) So, though a baptism not done by immersion would be irregular, it's still a valid baptism. I think in the case of these infant baptisms we have the same situation. 

Conclusion

A pastor or group of elders at a church is unlikely to know the circumstances of God's regenerative work in a person. Thus, I put the responsibility on the believer to determine their baptismal candidacy as it relates to their infant baptism. I believe this very short description matches a sense in which a person can both hold to credo-baptism and also affirm that infant baptism can be valid, but irregular.  

Review: A Modern Exposition of the 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith, Part 3: Of God and the Holy Trinity

To this point, I have interacted a great deal with Waldron's ideas on the confession. However, on this particular issue we have extensive online access to Waldron's thoughts on the matter. Much of Waldron's commentary in this chapter centers around hypostatic subordination of Christ in relation to tdeeplher. In a response to a book by Millard Erickson, Dr. Waldron gives us detailed commentary on this doctrine and how it plays out in our everyday lives. (It should be noted, that while I have a great deal appreciation for Dr. Erickson's Systematic Theology, his stand on the issues in question is a great disappointment to me.) As the following links will show, there is great implication for the relationship between husbands and wives in the relationships of the Trinity. Here is Waldron's work:

Who's Tampering with the Trinity? Part 1

Who's Tampering with the Trinity? Part 2

Who's Tampering with the Trinity? Part 3

Who's Tampering with the Trinity? Part 4

Who's Tampering with the Trinity? Part 5

Who's Tampering with the Trinity? Part 6

Waldron's work is strong and insightful, I highly suggest you give it a read. 

Rationalism and the Trinity

The links above will give you a very full impression of Waldron's commentary on subordination in the Trinity, so now we will focus on Waldron's ideas relating to how we are able to understand the Trinity, itself. First, let's take a look at the specific paragraph being discussed from the confession:

In this divine and infinite Being there are three subsistences, the Father, the Word or Son, and the Holy Spirit. All are one in substance, power, and eternity; each having the whole divine essence, yet this essence being undivided.The Father was not derived from any other being; He was neither brought into being by, nor did He issue from any other being.- The Son is eternally begotten of the Father.- The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.- All three are infinite, without beginning, and are therefore only one God, Who is not to be divided in nature and being, but distinguished by several peculiar relative properties, and also their personal relations.- This doctrine of the Trinity is the foundation of all our communion with God, and our comfortable dependence on Him.

Now, with this description in mind, this description that is one of the most extensive on the Trinity in any confession or creed in the history of the church, let's take a look at Waldron's reaction, the emphasis is mine:

The doctrine of the Trinity is and must forever be a divine mystery. It is a misconception of the creeds of the church (which are epitomized in this paragraph of the Confession) to think that they were intended to explain this mystery. Historically, the opposite was really the case. In the Monarchian (also known as the Sabellian or Modalist) heresy, the church was offered the option of explaining the mystery by saying that God was ultimately only one person in three successive modes of existence. In the Arian heresy the church was offered the option of explaining the mystery by saying that Jesus Christ and the Spirit were not God in the full sense of the word. Both options would have resolved the tension, but the church refused to say either. It maintained the mystery by maintaining that God was in one sense one and in another sense three. It asserted that ultimately God was both one and three: One essence or substance and three persons or subsistences. The creeds of the church fence the mystery. They do not explain it. The incomprehensibility of God means that the doctrines will involve holy ministries which transcend human reason and contradict fleshly wisdom (Note, for instance, chapter 3 'Of God's decree' and chapter 8 'Of Christ the Mediator'). Such mysteries must be accepted with humility and reverence by an intellect weaned from the arrogant and foolish notion of rationalism that it must or can comprehend the divine Being (Ps 131).

Now, as evidenced by the half a dozen links at the top of this post, it is not Waldron's contention that this small piece of the confession is all that the church can say in relation to the Trinity. What he is saying, however, is that the proper relationship of humanity to certain mysteries of God is one where we can frame the terms of the mystery (as the confession does) and consider implications of that mystery (as Waldron does in the articles above and in the rest of his chapter in our text). Neither of these constitute trying to grasp the full details of this mystery through rationalism. Instead, he insists that we should, out of humility, accept our inability to grasp this mystery and stop there.

This screams against every impulse of the modern philosophical and evangelical community. This idea that we should halt our inquiry is met in the contemporary mindset with derision and accusations of laziness or unwillingness to grow intellectually. This is a very serious charge and one that must be dealt with by those of Waldron's perspective with great care and respect. Waldron, in his exposition, is not giving us a course in epistemology, so we would certainly not expect him to make a fully defense of his assertions, but let us consider briefly a few considerations that are outside of Waldron's purview.

I discussed in my last post, which you may find here, that there are times when our confessions should be expanded or revised such that the substance of our beliefs can address new, modern questions in a way that is consistent with our heritage. On the surface, what Waldron is proposing here seems to be in direct contradiction to that idea. Many scholars would insist that the historic creeds and confessions need extensive revision on this topic, because they are not nearly complete in their explanation of this doctrine. They would happily apply Waldron's own argument against him and demand that he revise his statement.

How should Waldron respond? Well, it seems obvious that based on Waldron's argument that any expansion should be completely consistent with the heritage behind it. Waldron's contention, then, rests on the idea that all attempts to subject the doctrine of the Trinity to rationalism violate the doctrine put forth in the historical creeds and confessions.

Further, and more importantly, a confession is the declaration of what the Bible teaches about a doctrine, not what rationalism or philosophy says should be the case. Our proposed revisions in our last post were centered in trying to better explain what the Bible says about topics in a way that addresses modern forms of questions surrounding those topic. Waldron would argue (rightly) that the mystery that we see in the confession is the one that the Word of God itself leaves us with.

That makes the burden of updating the confession a Biblical enterprise and not a rationalistic philosophical one. That is not to say that reason has no place in theology; of course not! The entire discipline of systematic theology is an example of reason in the building of doctrinal expression, but this enterprise is deeply rooted in Scripture as its sole source of information.

One might respond to this by saying "yes, but already we have discussed the term 'verbal plenary inspiration', and even here you use the word 'Trinity' neither of which are in the Bible!" Yes, of course, we use these terms with the intention of having them represent what the Scripture teaches. These are terms of systematization of the message of Scripture, not concepts that we are developing outside of the testimony of the Word.

Conclusion

The header for this blog says that theology and philosophy are not at odds with one another, they simply need to be put in the right order. This topic of the Trinity is a perfect example of that.principle in action. Philosophical truths are used in the systematization of of what the Scripture teaches, but if ever Philosophy adds to the concepts taught in Scripture, it has overstepped its bounds. Reason is a God given gift, but we must use it as God intended, and it should never be used to add to the truth of God's Word.

This youtube video is a bit different in tone from our post, today, but it communicates the same truth, and for that reason I'm thrilled to share it with you:

Arguments that Young Earth Creationists should avoid.

The other day I posted about arguments against Young Earth Creationism that just do not work. You can find that post here. I got two primary complaints, first that I had not shown proper nuanced forms of the arguments I had issue with. This is a fair point, and I am happy to admit that the arguments I discussed are invalid in the form I presented them, but arguments of that type are not necessarily invalid. My complaints in the other post were about the tokens represented, all of which I have heard. Every argument needs to be evaluated on its own merit.

The other complaint I encountered was that I said nothing negative about arguments used by Young Earth Creationists. After all, when I talked about Baptism I took issue with both the side I disagreed with and also those who I did agree with. (You can see that, here.) Why did I not do the same with Creationism? Well,  my policy on blog posts is that I do not want to write a post longer than what I would want to read if I were clicking on the link. I personally do not prefer long blogs, if I want the full scale arguments I will buy and read the book. So, in order to write a blog post that addresses both sides of the Creationism argument, I would have to break that rule. However, I am happy to write on both sides, and had actually already started this post when I published its cousin the other day. So, here it is: Arguments that Young Earth Creationists should avoid.

Exact dating of the earth using OT genealogies

I really appreciate everything Answers in Genesis does. I support their ministry and I look forward to getting out to the Creation Museum once their Ark Encounter project is complete. However, they use one argument, extensively, that just is not conclusive as they would like it to be. An example of this argument can be found here. The issue here is not that the majority of modern Biblical scholars think these genealogies are not exact, it's that the text never claims that the list is exhaustive. Before we start to worry that this leads us down some slippery slope, consider the genealogies we have in the New Testament. We know that they are not. Now, I understand that the Genesis account is a different language in a different time, but let's keep in mind that we still have a framework here for an divinely inspired genealogy that doesn't  include every single name.

So, here's the rub, if it is possible that a Biblical genealogy can be less than exhaustive, then it is illogical to argue that the earth must have a certain age because a genealogy in the Bible includes names and ages that add up to that age. The information available does not give us the deductive conclusion that this argument is attempting to give. The AIG article above would have been completely fine if it had gotten to the end and said: "Thus, based on the evidence available, we think that a no gap genealogy is the best conclusion" there would be no issue. However, too often this argument gets tossed out by Young Earth Creationists as an indisputable proof, and this is not a rational conclusion. 

Yom

In the Baptism post, linked above, we have a discussion on the use of the word baptizo in the New Testament, and the logical fallacy of assuming that a word has the same meaning every single time. (We cited D.A. Carson's work on exegetical fallacies.) Too often YEC adherents do the same thing with yom, insisting that it means a 24 hour day. I think that it does mean a 24 hour day, here, and I quite like arguments that try to show that grouping the word 'day' with qualifiers about evening and morning indicates that 24 hours is the time period being described. But, again, this is not a deductive argument, so using this argument as a indisputable proof is logically invalid. 

Don't argue that Young Earth Creationists have science figured out!

We don't, and that's perfectly okay. If we as Creationists have scientific theories that do not work, we should be honest and reasonable enough to admit it. There's nothing wrong with seeing a scientific question that has not been answered yet and saying: "This topic needs more scientific research." Science has been done by Christians for centuries, and they never had all the answers. There's no reason to think that we suddenly have it all figured out now. If we want to reproach Old Earth adherents for acting as those their science doesn't have serious gaps we absolutely cannot do any differently for our own theories. That would be a special pleading fallacy, and I've seen it happen way too often. I am not a scientist, but I've seen enough science that comes to Young Earth conclusions to be satisfied, as a Philosopher and Theologian, intellectually in being a Young Earth Creationist. 

Conclusion

Being correct does not give you the right to use invalid arguments. In fact, I often tell my students that those with the correct conclusions bear a greater responsibility in their argumentation, because bad arguments tarnish the reputation of the truth. It is the same reason why I get infuriated when I see people claim the Bible is the Word of God and then try to prove it by KJV Onlyism (here). Defend the truth, but do so in a way that has integrity. 

Arguments against Young Earth Creationism that just don't work...

Maybe you are reading this as an Young Earth Creationist, maybe not. I have no idea. What I do know is that even if you believe Young Earth Creationism is wrong, there are some common arguments against it that simply do not work, logically.

The Book of Genesis is not a scientific text!

Cards on the table, I am a Young Earth Creationist, and I am intellectually satisfied in being so, my reasons for it are primarily theological, but those are a very different discussion for a very different day. One of the most common arguments I experience against YEC is that the book of Genesis is not a scientific text, or in other words, it is not trying to make technical scientific claims. Therefore, it would be wrong to base a scientific hypothesis on it because it was never intended to be scientific.

Every YEC I have ever known is simply dumbfounded by how anything anti-YEC is supposed to follow from the statement 'Genesis is not a scientific text.' Our response is and always has been, to put it eloquently: 'Duh'.The fact that this text was not written for the purpose of science by its original author does absolutely nothing to show that it is not literal in what it says happened. 

My wife and I like watching the show 'Mythbusters'. Every week, the team takes on three or four myths and test them scientifically to see if they have any merit to them. For instance, one week they tested whether or not you could stick your hand in molten lead without burning it. As it turns out, you can: 

Something called the 'Leidenfrost effect' makes this possible. There also happens to be a specific minimum temperature that the lead has to be heated to for this to work. This 'myth' can be a good analogy for what we are talking about here. Nothing in the myth said anything about the very important scientific detail of minimum temperature, because the 'myth' was not trying to be a scientific hypothesis. However, that does not mean that it is not literally true that you can put your hand in molten lead without, well, losing it. 

So if Genesis is not trying to a scientific document, but it is trying to give us a historical account, then it can be literally true that the earth was created in six consecutive twenty-four hour days without it being a scientific hypothesis. Thus, saying that the Genesis creation account is not a scientific account does nothing at all to prove that it is not literal. 

"That's a poem if I ever saw one..."

This little quote comes from a Christian musician in the group 'Gungor' very recently about why he believes that the Genesis creation account is not a literal account. The reasoning goes, presumably, that if it is a poem it cannot be a literal account. Is this true?

I apologize to my British friends for this particular example, but the following is an excerpt classic American poem by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow called Paul Revere's Ride: 

"Listen my children and you shall hear

Of the midnight ride of Paul Revere,

On the eighteenth of April, in Seventy-five;

Hardly a man is now alive

Who remembers that famous day and year.

He said to his friend, "If the British march

By land or sea from the town to-night,

Hang a lantern aloft in the belfry arch

Of the North Church tower as a signal light,--

One if by land, and two if by sea;

And I on the opposite shore will be,

Ready to ride and spread the alarm

Through every Middlesex village and farm,

For the country folk to be up and to arm."

Then he said "Good-night!" and with muffled oar

Silently rowed to the Charlestown shore,

Just as the moon rose over the bay,

Where swinging wide at her moorings lay

The Somerset, British man-of-war;

A phantom ship, with each mast and spar

Across the moon like a prison bar,

And a huge black hulk, that was magnified

By its own reflection in the tide."

What we have above is definitely a poem, and a quite good one, but it is also chocked full of historical fact. http://www.paulreverehouse.org/ride/real.html has a brief retelling of the actual account. From Longfellow's poem we get actual history. There is no logical reason why something must be historically fictitious simply because it is poetic. Because of this, any argument that says "It is a poem, and not history.." commits a logical fallacy, the two genres are not mutually exclusive. 

But all scientists believe the earth is old...

I love it when two fallacies happen at once, that's the kind of nerdy that a couple years of study in Philosophy will get you. The most obvious of the two is called an argument ad populum. This fallacy ('argument from the people' for the English speakers out there) asserts that because the majority of people believe something, it must therefore be true. In this instance it is appealing to the majority of a specific people group, but it is still a fallacy. There is no logical connection between the number of people who believe a theory to be true and whether or not that theory is actually true.

On a more fundamental level, look at the historical track record of science for numerous example. The Sun did not revolve around the Earth when the majority of scientists believed that it did, and by that same logic the fact that a lot of scientists now believe the earth is billions of years old does not in any way prove that it actually is.

That being said, the arguments put forth by the majority of scientists do carry weight and have to be engaged, but these arguments are to be judged on their own merit, not by the number of people who already support it.

The other fallacy here is what is known as a 'No True Scotsman' fallacy. It goes like this: one person says "No Scotsman likes coffee" two which a person can reply "Well Farquar is a Scotsman, and he likes coffee a lot". The first person responds: "Well, no True Scotsman likes coffee."

The meaning of Scotsman is a man of Scottish descent, and the arguer has claimed that all men who fit this description feel a certain way about coffee. When shown a Scotsman who does like coffee, he simply insists that this person is not a genuine member of the category in discussion.

I've heard Old Earth adherents say: "All scientists believe in Old Earth." To which I reply "Jason Lisle (PhD in Astrophysics from the University of Colorado) is a scientist, and he does not believe in Old Earth." The reply I've heard so many times is "All real scientists believe in Old Earth." This is logical nonsense, a desperate attempt to eliminate dissent from the discussion. 

Conclusion

In brief, we have shown in a very basic way that some of these complaints about YEC are simply invalid arguments, they are not based in reason and should be discarded by those who use them against YEC and not taken seriously by those who support YEC. There is no strength in these arguments, by themselves. Nothing here is in any way proof of Young Earth Creationism. Just because an opponent of YEC uses a logical fallacy does not mean that his side of the argument is wrong, he or she simply happens to be logically invalid. YEC needs, and has, its own positive arguments, but those are beyond my purview today.

Bart Ehrman made me a better apologist.

Bart Ehrman is very frustrating. He does, in my estimation, a poor job of realizing his own biases and presuppositions and therefore fails to see how they affect his conclusions. However, Dr. Ehrman is a very smart man, and he is an excellent New Testament scholar. The other day he made me a better apologist, by pointing out an aspect of a favorite argument of mine that I had failed to address to this point. Let's break down the argument, Erhman's objection, and a possible response.

The Argument

When discussing the resurrection of Jesus, we often make the case that the resurrection of Jesus is the best historical explanation of the facts given the alternate possibilities. The three primary alternative theories are 'Swoon' theories, 'Stolen Body' theories, and 'Mass Hallucination' theories. Each of these are shown one by one to be very unlikely, if not impossible. 

Dr. Ehrman holds to a Mass Hallucination theory, which has always been dismissed by Protestants like myself due to what we see as the extreme unlikelihood of hundreds of people having the same hallucination at the same time. This seems to be extremely unlikely and even harder to prove. 

Ehrman's Response

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAhw2cVRVsA&list=WL

^This is a good video. I obviously disagree with Ehrman's conclusions, but I respect the way he carries himself here, and from the 45:00 mark on he makes some really good points about problems with Humanism and there is also a very interesting question and answer session. 

Ehrman believes that Jesus' body was never found because he was never buried, and that the sightings of Jesus after his death were Mass Hallucination. He points out, very excellently, in my opinion, that Catholics often claim en mass to have seen the Virgin Mary and we as Protestants think that this is a Mass Hallucination. He's absolutely correct that if a Protestant holds these views simultaneously that he is incoherent with himself. 

One possible response

As you read this, I don't know what your view is on Demonology, depending on what that is changes whether or not my solution is of any value to you. But even if my solution is not one you agree with, keep in mind that if you hold both views stated above, there is a contradiction that really needs to be resolved. 

As Christians we believe that we 'wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers...' (Ephesians 6). We believe that our adversary, Satan, has at his disposal legions of demons. Famous atheist Richard Dawkins likes to say that we are all atheists, and that he is just believes in one less God than the Christian does. Well, on one hand he is right, he believes in one less god but he believes in countless fewer spiritual beings. I have no problem saying that people of other faiths have very real spiritual experiences, because there are demons that are the enemies of God who are at work in this world. When a Muslim says he encounters a jinni, I am not really surprised. By the same principle, if I believe that the sightings of Mary are not genuine, and I do, I can say so without violating the consistency of my own viewpoint by pointing out that my view accommodates a third option, rendering Ehrman's challenge a false dilemma. In this way his assertion of the Mass Hallucination theories fails to breach the Christian faith in any meaningful way.

For more on the resurrection of Jesus, see the following:

http://www.amazon.com/The-Son-Rises-Historical-Resurrection/dp/1579104649/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1408538457&sr=8-2&keywords=craig+resurrection

http://www.amazon.com/Case-Resurrection-Jesus-Gary-Habermas-ebook/dp/B001QOGJY0/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408538492&sr=8-1&keywords=habermas+resurrection

KJV Only?

First, I would be remiss if I did not share this resource with you, since it is better than anything I could say on the subject: http://www.amazon.com/The-King-James-Only-Controversy/dp/0764206052

Second, on the occasion that you find yourself discussing translations of the Bible with a KJV onlyist, here are a couple of simple things you can point out:

1. The translators of the KJV were not KJV onlyists:

"REASONS MOVING US TO SET DIVERSITY OF SENSES IN THE MARGIN,
WHERE THERE IS GREAT PROBABILITY FOR EACH

Some peradventure would have no variety of senses to be set in the margin, lest the authority of the Scriptures for deciding of controversies by that show of uncertainty, should somewhat be shaken. But we hold their judgment not to be sound in this point. For though, "whatsoever things are necessary are manifest," as S. Chrysostom saith, [S. Chrysost. in II. Thess. cap. 2.] and as S. Augustine, "In those things that are plainly set down in the Scriptures, all such matters are found that concern Faith, Hope, and Charity." [S. Aug. 2. de doctr. Christ. cap. 9.] Yet for all that it cannot be dissembled, that partly to exercise and whet our wits, partly to wean the curious from the loathing of them for their everywhere plainness, partly also to stir up our devotion to crave the assistance of God's spirit by prayer, and lastly, that we might be forward to seek aid of our brethren by conference, and never scorn those that be not in all respects so complete as they should be, being to seek in many things ourselves, it hath pleased God in his divine providence, here and there to scatter words and sentences of that difficulty and doubtfulness, not in doctrinal points that concern salvation, (for in such it hath been vouched that the Scriptures are plain) but in matters of less moment, that fearfulness would better beseem us than confidence, and if we will resolve upon modesty with S. Augustine, (though not in this same case altogether, yet upon the same ground) Melius est debitare de occultis, quam litigare de incertis, [S. Aug li. S. de Genes. ad liter. cap. 5.] "it is better to make doubt of those things which are secret, than to strive about those things that are uncertain." There be many words in the Scriptures, which be never found there but once, (having neither brother or neighbor, as the Hebrews speak) so that we cannot be holpen by conference of places. Again, there be many rare names of certain birds, beasts and precious stones, etc. concerning the Hebrews themselves are so divided among themselves for judgment, that they may seem to have defined this or that, rather because they would say something, than because they were sure of that which they said, as S. Jerome somewhere saith of the Septuagint. Now in such a case, doth not a margin do well to admonish the Reader to seek further, and not to conclude or dogmatize upon this or that peremptorily? For as it is a fault of incredulity, to doubt of those things that are evident: so to determine of such things as the Spirit of God hath left (even in the judgment of the judicious) questionable, can be no less than presumption. Therefore as S. Augustine saith, that variety of Translations is profitable for the finding out of the sense of the Scriptures: [S. Aug. 2. de doctr. Christian. cap. 14.] so diversity of signification and sense in the margin, where the text is no so clear, must needs do good, yea, is necessary, as we are persuaded. We know that Sixtus Quintus expressly forbiddeth, that any variety of readings of their vulgar edition, should be put in the margin, [Sixtus 5. praef. Bibliae.] (which though it be not altogether the same thing to that we have in hand, yet it looketh that way) but we think he hath not all of his own side his favorers, for this conceit. They that are wise, had rather have their judgments at liberty in differences of readings, than to be captivated to one, when it may be the other. If they were sure that their high Priest had all laws shut up in his breast, as Paul the Second bragged, [Plat. in Paulo secundo.] and that he were as free from error by special privilege, as the Dictators of Rome were made by law inviolable, it were another matter; then his word were an Oracle, his opinion a decision. But the eyes of the world are now open, God be thanked, and have been a great while, they find that he is subject to the same affections and infirmities that others be, that his skin is penetrable, and therefore so much as he proveth, not as much as he claimeth, they grant and embrace."

Notice a couple of things pointed out here by the scholars who brought us the KJV. First, they agree with Augustine that having many translations is profitable. Second, notice that they are saying that the original KJV had marginal notes offering alternate translations. These men did not think that their work was perfect or infallible. Why on earth should we?

2. How should the Bible be translated into languages that are not English?

If I am a modern scholar who wants to translate the Word of God into a new language so that the people of that tribe or nation can read the Word for themselves, should I translate from the Greek and Hebrew or should I translate from the King James Version? If I translate from the King James Version, is my translation 'equal' to the KJV?

If it is not equal, are we saying that the KJV is the only approved transmission of the Word of God in the world? This notion reminds me of the Islamic sects who insist that the Qu'ran must be read in Arabic to be a valid transmission. No, thank you.

3. But, how can we say that the Bible is inerrant if there can be many translations that do not agree perfectly?

This is a complaint I encounter quite often from KJV onlyists. They say that you can only really believe in inerrancy if you actually have a translation that is perfect. There is a fallacy at play, here, and it is one of equivocation. The KJVO use of the term inerrant reminds me of the great movie quote: "You keep using that word, I do not think it means what you think it means." When we say that the Bible is inerrant, we are not talking about translations at all. Here is a great historical church document that addresses the notion of inerrancy in depth: http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/creeds/chicago.htm


The document linked above is the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, from that Statement we have the following section:

"E. Transmission and Translation


Since God has nowhere promised an inerrant transmission of Scripture, it is necessary to affirm that only the autographic text of the original documents was inspired and to maintain the need of textual criticism as a means of detecting any slips that may have crept into the text in the course of its transmission. The verdict of this science, however, is that the Hebrew and Greek text appears to be amazingly well preserved, so that we are amply justified in affirming, with the Westminster Confession, a singular providence of God in this matter and in declaring that the authority of Scripture is in no way jeopardized by the fact that the copies we possess are not entirely error-free.

Similarly, no translation is or can be perfect, and all translations are an additional step away from the autograph. Yet the verdict of linguistic science is that English-speaking Christians, at least, are exceedingly well served in these days with a host of excellent translations and have no cause for hesitating to conclude that the true Word of God is within their reach. Indeed, in view of the frequent repetition in Scripture of the main matters with which it deals and also of the Holy Spirit's constant witness to and through the Word, no serious translation of Holy Scripture will so destroy its meaning as to render it unable to make its reader "wise for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus" (2 Tim. 3:15)."


Based on this concept of inerrancy the KJVO poses no challenge or dilemma to the Christian who wishes to affirm inerrancy while simultaneously rejecting KJVO.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the conclusions of KJV Onlyism are not only problematic, but also unnecessary. The position creates more problems than it attempts to solve, and should be rejected in favor of a more reasoned, robust notion of Biblical inerrancy such as that found in the Chicago Statement.

Baptism and arguments that just don't work.

Introduction

Infants or believers only? Should we immerse, pour, or sprinkle? These are often the debates at hand when this subject is brought up. Both sides have a long list of arguments that for them prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that they are right on the matter. However, the goal here is not to answer these questions, but rather to point out types of argument that both sides use, which by themselves do not achieve anything.

If you have ever studied the issue before, you will certainly have heard a Baptist say: "The word βαπτίζω means immersion, in the Greek, so clearly were must immerse people at baptism." You may have also heard a paedobaptist (those who baptize infants) use the phrase "they baptized households, and households include infants, so infants should clearly be baptized."

In the sometimes frightening world of theology debates, online or in person, I've seen these phrases again, again, and again. The problem is, neither of these arguments work, by themselves. Each of them commits a fallacy when one tries to move from the evidence in the argument to a conclusive, deductive, beyond question conclusion.

Baptizo and the 'root fallacy'

Let's look at the first argument, the one from Baptists. This one hits home for me personally, because I have been a Baptist for my entire life. The claim is that because 'baptizo' is a verb that means 'to immerse', then we must immerse people when we baptize them. This is something called a 'root fallacy'. Just because a word has a certain meaning does not mean that this particular meaning is in use in every circumstance. D.A. Carson gives us a great explanation of this fallacy in his book Exegetical Fallacies:

“One of the most enduring fallacies, the root fallacy presupposes that every word actually has a meaning bound up with its shape or its components. In this view, meaning is determined by etymology; that is by the roots of a word.  How many times have we been told that because the verbal cognate of apostolos (apostle) is apostello (I send), the root meaning of 'apostle' is 'one who is sent.'?  In the preface of the New King James Bible, we are told that the literal meaning of monogenes is 'only begotten.'  Is that true?  How often do preachers refer to the verb agapao (to love), contrast it with phileo (to love) and deduce that the text is saying something about a special kind of loving, for no other reason than that agapao is used?

All of this is linguistic nonsense.  We might have guessed as much if we were more acquainted with the etymology of English words. Anthony C. Thistleton offers by way of example our word ‘nice’, which comes from the Latin nescius, meaning 'ignorant.'  Our 'good-by' is a contraction for Anglo-Saxon 'God be with you.' It is certainly easy to imagine how 'God be with you' came to be 'good-by.'  But I know of no one today who in saying that such and such a person is 'nice'  believes that he or she has in some measure labeled that person ignorant because the 'root meaning' or 'hidden meaning' or 'literal meaning' of “nice” is ‘ignorant’...

The meaning of a word may reflect its etymology; and it must be admitted that this is more common in synthetic languages like Greek or German, with their relatively high percentages of transparent words (words that have some kind of natural relation to their meaning) than in a language like English, where words are opaque (i.e., without any natural relation to their meaning)) Even so, my point is that we cannot responsibly assume that etymology is related to meaning. We can only test the point by discovering the meaning of a word inductively."

Notice the last paragraph. The Baptist is not necessarily wrong about the meaning of the word, but the argument he has presented here is simply not conclusive. If this argument is the only evidence he has presented, their case is simply not persuasive. Given a broader context in a Scriptural passage, or surrounded by other evidence for the practice of immersion in baptism, the meaning of the word 'baptizo' may be relevant, or useful, but on its own it proves nothing.

Households and moving from 'some' to 'all'

Now let's consider a paedobaptist argument. The way this usually goes is that someone will point to a number of cases in the New Testament where it is said that someone's entire household was baptized. A household, they claim, is as a term all inclusive and means everyone in a given family and retinue. So, by a household being baptized, all members of the family, including infants, would have been baptized, therefore we have a Biblical example of infants being baptized.

First, let's notice that just like the Baptist, above, it's entirely possible that their conclusion may be right. There are certainly instances where by household we mean everyone from mother and father to children and infants to servants. Second, let's notice that there are possible exceptions to this:

1. Not all households contain all possible members. Some households contain servants, most, do not. Some households have no daughters, some have no sons, some have no children at all. Of the ones that have children they may all be well older than infants.

2. Saying that an entire family likes something does not necessarily have to intend the inclusion of all the members. If a father of three of children ages seven, eight, and one tells me that their whole family loves roller coasters, I am going to assume that the one year old has not been consulted. Am I going to assume that the father is lying? Of course not, in the context of the conversation he was using family to refer to the relevant persons to the question at hand.

The stronger ground of these two is by far the first one. Let's consider a simple logical argument that can use this idea to show the fallacy at work in moving from 'households were baptized' to 'infants should be baptized.'

1. In Acts 16, all of the Philippian Jailer's household were baptized.

2. Some households include infants

3. Therefore, because the Philippian Jailer had his entire household baptized, infants should be baptized.

The flaw here is as obvious as it is fatal. The fact that some households includes infants does nothing, whatsoever, to establish that there were infants in the Philippian Jailer's household, which is critical to establishing infant baptism as absolute fact based on Acts 16.

The notion that this household included or very likely included infants is easy to accept for a person who is already convinced of paedobaptism. This concept fits very cleanly into their Biblical interpretation based on the presupposition of paedobaptism that they are already bringing to the text. However, this does nothing to establish the idea of paedobaptism as fact for someone who does not already hold it.

Conclusion

Both arguments presented here fail because they are presented as conclusive, deductive arguments without having enough evidence and information to actually reach that standard. Both of them are useful within the context of a cumulative case for their respective positions. For example, in the context of a 'sign of the covenant analogous to circumcision' argument for paedobaptism, it is helpful to point out that passages like Acts 16 fit cleanly with the model. What this means is that both the concept of household baptism and definition of baptizo can in fact be part of larger inductive or abductive cases, which try to show that the conclusion is likely or the best answer available instead of establishing them as absolute fact. Using these arguments in this way is much more useful than trying to use them as stand alone proofs.